tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3494697161252038542.post326456790463205764..comments2023-04-28T06:08:36.287-07:00Comments on Being Sufficiently: The death of the stars means I don't have to listen to you.Chrishttp://www.blogger.com/profile/07550200863030353202noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3494697161252038542.post-89347376443701877232011-03-21T16:06:21.037-07:002011-03-21T16:06:21.037-07:00i do find the nihilist project saisfying, but i un...i do find the nihilist project saisfying, but i understand you're reseverations. im not sure that it shuts down all areas of enquiry into meaning - the gneration of meaning and beliefs become a source of great interest given the fact that nature, in itself or devoid of relation to thought, is intrinsically meaningless. especially as it seems to infer that human projects/beilefs occur ex nihilo - in that something (meaning) emerges from nothing (meaninglessness). i think that there is an evolutionary answer to this but it still doesnt quite cover the "legitimate and interesting areas of enquiry". the fact of purposiveness inside us is the intersting question and exploring it seems to be an agenda for schelling which is why im really enjoying this reading group with iainpeterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16832366700843323043noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3494697161252038542.post-71086394983431218882011-03-20T12:34:05.627-07:002011-03-20T12:34:05.627-07:00I'd agree with you that Iain's and Brassie...I'd agree with you that Iain's and Brassier's projects are amenable. See Ben Woodward at http://naughtthought.wordpress.com/ for instance.<br /><br />I'd also join you in agreeing with the three quotes you've picked. Although, as you rightly point out Brassier's project of disenchantment appears reductive since it dismisses the production of 'meaning', and considers that dismissial unproblematic, because:<br /><br />"a project is now underway to understand and explain human consciousness in terms that are compatible with the natural sciences, such that the meanings generated by consciousness can themselves be understood and explained as the products of purposeless but perfectly intelligible processes, which are at once neurobiological and sociohistorical."<br /><br />I've got no great disagreement with the general project, except that neuroscience is far from complete and in some philosophical difficulty if it's response to 'folk psychology' is to dismiss it as an uninteresting and false diversion.<br /><br />My problem with the nihilist-scientist project is it's similarity to Meillasoux's 'necessarily disappointing' response to the POSR - "for no reason". This doesn't explain anything and Brassier invocation of an indifferent and meaningless nature appears as an attempt to bulldozer legitimate and interesting areas of enquiry.Chrishttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07550200863030353202noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-3494697161252038542.post-57505308225217763582011-03-18T07:29:15.830-07:002011-03-18T07:29:15.830-07:00i've just read the brassier interview and i fo...i've just read the brassier interview and i found it delightful but i do take heed of your comments vis-a-vis the abberant language he used to describe opponents of his far-ranging project. however, i dont find them that problematic. it seems to me that a lot of debates range around people disagreeing virulently and i can only see this as a good thing which will prevent dead dogma. not everyone is going to agree with him and a lot of people will find his views alarming and this will lead to debates and the proliferation of better articulated positions - which in turn can potentially lead to a better understanding of nature and ourselves.<br />(see feyerabend)<br /><br />im also interested in a combination of his nihilist position, iain's account of powers/process and a grounding for scientific realism.<br /><br />i found the following three quotes very interesting:<br /> <br />1. “‘We understand nature better than we did, but this understanding no longer requires the postulate of an underlying meaning’”<br /><br />2. “The world has no author and there is no story enciphered in the structure of reality. No narrative is unfolding in nature” <br /><br />and any attempted revitalising of narrative/meaning is...<br /><br />3. “...doomed because it is the very category of narrative that has been rendered cognitively redundant by modern science. Science does not need to deny the significance of our evident psychological need for narrative; it just demotes it from its previously foundational metaphysical status to that of an epistemically derivative ‘useful fiction’.”<br /><br />i agree with these 3 quotes. however, In "Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature" Schelling argues that it is not a question of how there could be purpose outside of mind (quote 2 - which Brassier would dismiss) but the question of how it arises inside the mind, as "a useful epistemic fiction", that is the important question. <br /><br />This is not to say that the argument about meaning in nature-in-itself is not an intersting and important question (i agree with Brassier's nihilistic answer of no to this). but the question "How does purposiveness arise in me?", especially from a meaningless nature, (see pg 41 of the pdf i sent you) is of greater importance since it gets to the heart of what tobias would call "the naturalised production of the transcendental".<br /> <br />i suggest a combination of Brassier and iain: <br />nature, as the process of production, is meaningless but has contingently led to brains which generate useful narratives for the propagation of replication which has in turn evolved into an advanced memetic complex system – and again in turn we are now using elements of this contingent reason to de-mystify itself and its production (i.e. nature and thought as a natural product of nature). <br /><br />...but then again since this a blog-format im sure brassier would be appalled by my bastardisation of some of his ideas in this speculative manner :Ppeterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16832366700843323043noreply@blogger.com